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Abstract
This Note examines the conflicting provisions of the Liability Convention in the context of the
Cosmos 954 incident to determine whether the damages that Canada claimed would be recoverable
under the Convention. The analysis will illustrate the need for change in the Liability Convention’s
definition of the measure of damages. Finally, this Note presents a proposal that would render the
provisions more consistent with the spirit and the purpose of the Liability Convention.
CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL LIABILITY FOR
DAMAGE CAUSED BY SPACE OBJECTS:
DEFINITION AND DETERMINATION
OF DAMAGES AFTER THE
COSMOS 954 INCIDENT
INTRODUCTION
The United Nations General Assembly endorsed the Con-
vention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space
Objects' (Liability Convention or Convention), on November
29, 1971.2 The Liability Convention was the result often years
work3 by the Legal Sub-Committee of the Ad Hoc Committee
on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space4 (COPUOS). One of the
goals of the Convention is to provide a measure of damages
for cases involving injury or damage caused by space objects.5
1. Mar. 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, T.I.A.S. No. 7762, 10 I.L.M. 965 [hereinafter
cited as Liability Convention].
2. G.A. Res. 2777, 26 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 29) at 25, U.N. Doc. A/8429
(1971); see Foster, The Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space
Objects, 10 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 137, 137 (1972). The United Nations (UN) Ad Hoc
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS), created on December
13, 1958, had adopted and submitted to the UN General Assembly the final draft
convention on September 10, 1971. Id.; see also G. ZHUKOV & Y. KOLOSOV, INTERNA-
TIONAL SPACE LAW 101 (1984). "The convention is actually the first specific interna-
tional agreement on liability in the area of public law relations." Id.
3. The first draft proposal on liability was submitted by the United States on
June 4, 1962. USA: Proposal: Liability for Space Vehicle Accidents, U.N. Doc.
A/AC.105/C.2/L.4 (1962). The final draft was endorsed on November 29, 1971. See
C. CHRISTOL, THE MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OUTER SPACE 61 (1982); Cheng,
Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, I MANUAL ON
SPACE L. 83, 83 (1979).
4. The first United States proposal, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/L.4, supra note 3,
was submitted to COPUOS' Legal Sub-Committee, which has been the forum for the
development of international space law in the United Nations. C. CHRISTOL, supra
note 3, at 16-17. For a discussion of the birth of COPUOS, see id. at 12-20.
5. See infra notes 12-19 and accompanying text. The Liability Convention, supra
note 1, defines the term space object as including "component parts of a space object
as well as its launch vehicle and parts thereof." Id. art. I(d). "This non-definition was
the result of the acceptance by the Legal Sub-Committee of the suggestion that
,space object' had a reasonably understood and clear meaning and that it was only
necessary to include in a definition all the component parts and equipment of a space
object which could cause damage." Foster, supra note 2, at 145. Some problems
remain with the definition of the term. Id. at 144-49; see C. CHRISTOL, supra note 3, at
68, 72-73, 83. It is concluded that "the absence of a specific definition in the Con-
vention of a 'space object' should not be regarded as a meaningful defect of the
agreement." Id. at 108. A suggested definition is that of a "man-made vehicle
designed for launch into orbit and possessing the characteristics and potential neces-
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The final draft, however, included two conflicting definitions
for this measure.6 As a result, it is unclear what damages
would be recoverable under the Convention. 7
The Liability Convention has been invoked only once; in
the Cosmos 954 incident.8 In 1978, a Soviet satellite crashed
in the Canadian Northwest. Later that same year, the Cana-
dian Government presented a claim for damages based in part
on the Liability Convention, to the Government of the Soviet
Union. The incident was resolved through diplomatic chan-
nels, and the majority of the provisions of the Liability Con-
vention were left untested.
This Note examines the conflicting provisions of the Lia-
bility Convention in the context of the Cosmos 954 incident to
determine whether the damages that Canada claimed would be
recoverable under the Convention.9 The analysis will illustrate
the need for change in the Liability Convention's definition of
the meaure of damages.'0 Finally, this Note presents a propo-
sal that would render the provisions more consistent with the
spirit and the purpose of the Liability Convention."
I. PURPOSE OF THE LIABILITY CONVENTION
Reentry 12 of space object fragments into the earth's at-
mosphere has been rare, relative to the number of space ob-
sary for it to achieve at least one orbit." Id. at 109; see also Cheng, supra note 3, at 116-
17 (discussing the definition of "space object").
6. See infra notes 45-56 and accompanying text.
7. See Foster, supra note 2, at 157. "[N]o indication is given as to whether claims
will lie for both direct and indirect damage." Id.; see G. ZHUKOV & Y. KOLOSOV, supra
note 2, at 102; Haanappel, Some Observations on the Crash of Cosmos 954, 6J. SPACE L.
147, 148 (1978).
8. See infra notes 75-88 and accompanying text. There have been other incidents
where alarm was raised by the reentry of space objects into the earth's atmosphere.
Most notable among these are the Skylab incident in which a United States space lab
landed in the Australian desert and sea after a fall that carried it over several conti-
nents, Lyons, Skylab Debris Hits Australian Desert; No Harm Reported, N.Y. Times, July 12,
1979, at Al, col. 5, and the Cosmos 1402 incident, where another Soviet satellite in
the Cosmos line fell from orbit and crashed harmlessly into the Indian Ocean. Wil-
ford, Russian Satellite Falls Harmlessly Over Indian Ocean, N.Y. Times, Jan. 24, 1983, at
AI, col. 6.
9. See infra notes 45-74 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 91-118 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 119-44 and accompanying text.
12. For a general discussion of reentry, see Doyle, Reentering Space Objects: Facts
and Fiction, 6J. SPACE L. 107, 107-10 (1978).
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jects presently circling the earth. 13 There is, however, a very
real possibility that future space accidents may result in injury
to innocent persons, natural or juridical.' 4 The Legal Sub-
Committee imposed liability on launching states 15 with the in-
tent of inducing those engaged in space activities to take into
account the rights of those who might be harmed by such activ-
ities.' 6 While the advancement of space exploration is impor-
tant, it must not be pursued at the expense of remediless vic-
tims of damage. 17 The members also intended to draft effec-
tive rules and procedures to facilitate the prompt payment of
compensation to victims. 18 As a result, the Liability Conven-
tion is a victim-oriented agreement designed to balance the im-
portance of the advancement of space exploration against the
necessity of protecting innocent victims. 19
13. See STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON AERONAUTICAL AND SPACE SCIENCES, 92D
CONG., 2D SESS., STAFF REPORT ON CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL LIABILITY FOR
DAMAGES CAUSED BY SPACE OBJECTS 74 (Comm. Print 1972) [hereinafter cited as
STAFF REPORT]; Christol, International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, 74 AM.
J. INT'L L. 346, 350 n.14 (1980).
14. Wilkins, Substantive Bases for Recovery for Injuries Sustained by Private Individuals
as a Result of Fallen Space Objects, 6J. SPACE L. 161, 169 (1978). "In light of the very
real possibility of future [space] accidents . . . attention must be given internation-
ally and domestically to insure that it will not be the innocent injured person that
bears the risk of such injuries." Id.
By 1972, 44 space object fragments had been recorded as having reentered the
earth's atmosphere. See STAFF REPORT, supra note 13, at 74-75. They ranged in size
from small bits of debris to a four foot square flat steel plate weighing 640 pounds
that was recovered in the Southwestern United States. Id. The steel plate was identi-
fied as part of Soviet Cosmos 316. It and five oblong pieces of steel, 2 to 2.5 feet
long with an average weight of 150 pounds, fell in Kansas, Texas and Oklahoma in
August 1970. Id.
15. The "launching State" is defined in article I of the Liability Convention as
being:
(i) A State which launches or procures the launching of a space object;
(ii) A State from those territory or facility a space object is launched.
Liability Convention, supra note 1, art. I.
16. C. CHRISTOL, supra note 3, at 59.
17. Rajski, Convention on International Liability for Damages Caused by Space Objects-
An Important Step in the Development of the International Space Law, in PROCEEDINGS ON
THE SEVENTEENTH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 245, 249 (1974); Recent
Decisions, Space Law-International Liability for Space Exploration Activities, 7 TEX. INT'L
L.J. 523, 526 (1972).
18. See Christol, supra note 13, at 355.
19. Verbatim Record of the Seventy-Second Meeting, U.N. Doc.
A/AC.105/PV.72, at 46 (1969) (statement of Canada). The Convention was in-
tended to be victim-oriented, designed not as a reciprocal agreement between the
two prevailing space powers, the United States and the U.S.S.R., but as a safeguard
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II. BACKGROUND OF THE LIABILITY CONVENTION
On December 13, 1958, COPUOS was created to establish
legal principles and guidelines governing the use of outer
space.2" The Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the
Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer
Space 2 soon followed, establishing the application of interna-
tional law and the Charter of the United Nations to outer
space. 2
The subject of liability for damages from space vehicle ac-
cidents was first addressed by COPUOS in 195923 and was im-
mediately given priority status. 4 In June 1962, the United
States submitted the first draft proposal on liability,25 thus be-
for each state, perhaps in particular nonspace powers. Id.; see N. MAT'E, AEROSPACE
LAw: FROM SCIENTIFIC EXPLORATION TO COMMERCIAL UTILIZATION 169 (1977); Chris-
tol, supra note 13, at 355; Cocca, The Principle of "Full Compensation" in the Convention on
Liability for Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects Launched into Outer Space, in PRO-
CEEDINGS ON THE FIFTEENTH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 92, 92
(1972).
Herbert Reis, United States Delegate to the Legal Sub-Committee, remarked
that the fundamental American goal of the Convention was to assure the payment of
prompt and fair compensation to citizens who might be injured as a result of the
reentry of fragments of a foreign manmade space object. Reis, Some Reflections on the
Liability Convention for Outer Space, 6 J. SPACE L. 125, 126 (1978). The Convention
itself sets forth its purpose as follows:
Recognizing the need to elaborate effective international rules and proce-
dures concerning liability for damage caused by space objects and to ensure,
in particular, the prompt payment under the terms of this Convention of a
full and equitable measure of compensation to victims of such damage
Liability Convention, supra note 1, preamble.
20. See generally C. CHRISTOL, supra note 3, at 12-20 (discussing the birth of
COPUOS).
21. G.A. Res. 1962, 18 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 15) at 15, U.N. Doc. A/5515
(1964) [hereinafter cited as Declaration of Principles]; see Dembling, Principles Gov-
erning the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and
Other Celestial Bodies, I MANUAL ON SPACE L. 1, 5 (1979).
22. Declaration of Principles, supra note 21, at 15. "The activities of States in
the exploration and use of outer space shall be carried on in accordance with interna-
tional law, including the Charter of the United Nations, in the interest of maintaining
international peace and security and promoting international cooperation and under-
standing." Id.; see Dembling, supra note 21, at 5.
23. C. CHRISTOL, supra note 3, at 60; Foster, supra note 2, at 138. On July 14,
1959, the Committee reported that "the issue of 'liability for injury or damage
caused by space vehicles' would arise in the exploration, use, and exploitation of the
space environment." C. CHRISTOL, supra note 3, at 60; see Foster, supra note 2, at 138.
24. C. CHRISTOL, supra note 3, at 60; Cheng, supra note 3, at 83.
25. U.N. Doc. A/AC. 105/C.2/L.4, supra note 3.
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ginning a ten year process of negotiation, both formal and in-
formal, 26 that ended in the endorsement of the Liability Con-
vention in 1971.27
During that ten year period, the drafting of two other trea-
ties had an impact on the development, and delayed the draft-
ing of the Liability Convention.28 The Treaty on Principles
Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use
of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bod-
ies 29 (Principles Treaty), was drafted primarily during the
Legal Sub-Committee's Fifth Session, held in 1966.30 It was
intended to establish basic principles upon which international
space law, in the form of agreements and conventions, could
be built.3 ' Articles VI and VII of this Treaty pertain to interna-
tional liability for damages and are the basis upon which the
Liability Convention was developed.32
26. Cheng, supra note 3, at 89. As a result, it is impossible to tell how and when
agreement was reached on some of the most crucial liability issues. Id.
27. G.A. Res. 2777, supra note 2, at 25. The Delegations of Canada, Iran, Japan,
and Sweden were unable to support the Convention "because they believed it would
have been preferable to have had incorporated in the text provisions on measures of
compensation and especially on the settlement of claims more in accordance with
those that they had earlier proposed in the Legal Sub-Committee." UNCOPUOS
Report, 26 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 20) at 16, U.N. Doc. A/8420 (1971). These dele-
gations therefore reserved their positions on the substance of the text of the Conven-
tion. Id.
28. See C. CHRIsToL, supra note 3, at 61; infra notes 29-38 and accompanying
text.
29. Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 [herein-
after cited as Principles Treaty].
30. Dembling, supra note 21, at 1.
31. Id. at 35.
32. Principles Treaty, supra note 29, arts. VI-VII; see C. CHRISTOL, supra note 3,
at 61. Article VI provides as follows:
States Parties to the Treaty shall bear international responsibility for na-
tional activities in outer space, including the moon and other celestial bod-
ies, whether such activities are carried on by governmental agencies or by
non-governmental entities, and for assuring that national activities are car-
red out in conformity with the provisions set forth in the present Treaty.
The activities of non-governmental entities in outer space, including the
moon and other celestial bodies, shall require authorization and continuing
supervision by the appropriate State Party to the Treaty. When activities are
carried on in outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, by
an international organization, responsibility for compliance with this Treaty
shall be borne both by the international organization and by the States Par-
ties to the Treaty participating in such organization.
Principles Treaty, supra note 3, art. VI. Article VII provides as follows:
Each State Party to the Treaty that launches or procures the launching of an
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Negotiation on the Agreement on the Rescue of Astro-
nauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects
Launched Into Outer Space" (Return Agreement) lasted al-
most as long as negotiation on the Liability Convention, 34 pri-
marily due to a general lack of interest on the part of the dele-
gates from nations other than those from the Soviet Union and
the United States.3 5 Article 5 of the Return Agreement refers
to the obligations of the launching state to bear the expenses
of cleanup and recovery when a satellite lands in the territory
of a signatory state.36 The article has been read to relieve the
launching state of responsibility for such costs where the
launching state does not request the return of its space ob-
ject.3 7 As long as that state declines to request the return of its
space object, the Return Agreement does not apply. The vic-
tim state must rely on the Liability Convention for any relief in
object into outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, and
each State Party from whose territory or facility an object is launched, is
internationally liable for damage to another State Party to the Treaty or to
its natural or juridical persons by such object or its component parts on the
Earth, in air spaqe. or in outer space, including the moon and other celestial
bodies.
Id. art. VII.
33. Apr. 22, 1968, 19 U.S.T. 7570, T.I.A.S. No. 6599, 672 U.N.T.S. 119 [herein-
after cited as Return Agreement].
34. The Return Agreement, supra note 33, took 10 years to draft, from 1959 to
1968. Lee, Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of
Objects Launched into Outer Space, I MANUAL ON SPACE L. 53, 53 (1979).
35. Lee, supra note 34, at 53. The subject of the Return Agreement was not of
primary interest to anyone but the space powers who had space objects and astro-
nauts to be concerned about. Id. There was some basic disagreement on legal issues
and approaches to the issues between the two space powers. Id.
36. Return Agreement, supra note 33, art. 5(5). Article 5(5) provides that
"[e]xpenses incurred in fulfilling obligations to recover and return a space object or
its component parts under paragraphs 2 and 3 of this article shall be borne by the
launching authority." Id. In essence, the provision "provides for payment by the
launching authority of expenses incurred by a Contracting Party in recovering and
returning a space object or component part, if requested by the launching party."
Dembling, Cosmos 954 and the Space Treaties, 6J. SPACE L. 129, 132 (1978).
37. Dembling, supra note 36, at 132. The treaty provides that recovery and re-
turn expenses "shall be borne" by the launching authority. Return Agreement, supra
note 33, art. 5(5). "Since the expenses incurred by the Contracting Party must be
borne by the launching state, a launching authority's request for such recovery and
return is a condition of this obligation." Dembling, supra note 36, at 132; see Lee,
supra note 34, at 72; Address by L.H. Legault & A. Farand, Canada's Claim for Dam-
age Caused by the Soviet Cosmos 954 Satellite, at 16, American Bar Ass'n Forum
Committee on Air and Space Law, First Annual Forum (Feb. 23-25, 1984) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Legault & Farand].
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paying for the removal of the space object.3
The ten year delay in finalizing the Liability Convention
was caused by the lack of consensus ° among the Legal Sub-
Committee members on such issues as the law applicable to
the measurement of damages, the status of international orga-
nizations with respect to the Convention, dispute resolution
procedures, limitation of liability, and nuclear damage.40 The
major factor in the delay, frequently complained of by the
United Nations General Assembly,4 t was the plurality of views
among the members of the Legal Sub-Committee.4 2 The un-
willingness of certain members of the Legal Sub-Committee to
participate in its proceedings was blamed for some delay. 43 It
was also apparent that the Principles Treaty would have to be
38. Lee, supra note 34, at 72. "Whether the launching authority is responsible
for . . . expenses [not connected with its request] is beyond the scope of the . . .
[Return] Agreement and may have to be resolved under other applicable rules of
international law, such as the Liability Convention." Id.
39. C. CHRISTOL, supra note 3, at 61-62. Foster, supra note 2, at 139-40. The
reasons given for this lack of consensus vary. One view is that the complex nature of
the problems themselves led to long negotiations and difficult agreements. C. CHRIS-
TOL, supra note 3, at 61; Dembling & Arons, Space Law and the United Nations: The Work
of the Legal Subcommittee of the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space,
32J. AIR L. & CoM, 329, 350 (1966).
40. C. CHRISTOL, supra note 3, at 61.
41. As early as December 14, 1962, the United Nations General Assembly was
urging COPUOS' Legal Sub-Committee to increase its efforts in drafting the Liability
Convention. G.A. Res. 1802, 17 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 17) at 5, U.N. Doc. A/5217
(1963); C. CHRISTOL, supra note 3, at 63. In 1970, the General Assembly adopted
G.A. Res. 2733B, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 20, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970),
emphasizing that delay in reaching an agreement on liability left the world in an un-
satisfactory state of vulnerability to space object accidents. Id. at 20; see Christol,
supra note 13, at 355.
42. Cheng, supra note 3, at 83, 91, 123-25; see C. CHRISTOL, supra note 3, at 62;
Deleau, La Convention sur la Responsabiliti Internationale pour les Dommages Causis par des
Objets Spatiaux, 1971 ANNUAIRE FRANgAIS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 876, 886 (Centre
National de la Recherche Scientifique); Foster, supra note 2, at 141.
43. Foster, supra note 2, at 140. One commentator attributed the delay in part
to "the refusal of certain members of the Committee-notably those from the Soviet
bloc-to participate in its work." Id.; see Cheng, supra note 3, at 91; Deleau, supra
note 42, at 886. Herbert Reis, United States Delegate to the Legal Sub-Committee,
expressed the problem as follows:
We at first found it difficult to engage the serious attention of the Soviet
Union, which, indeed, preferred throughout the following eight years of ne-
gotiation not to put forward proposals under its own name but instead to
rely upon Hungary.
Even today there might have been no liability convention but for the efforts
of the Government of India which took the initiative of trying to overcome a
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completed before a detailed liability agreement could be
reached."4
III. CONFLICT IN THE PROVISIONS OF THE LIABILITY
CONVENTION
Articles I, II, and XII of the Liability Convention outline
the process of defining and determining damages in space ob-
ject accidents. 45 However, these articles suffer from inconsis-
tencies that make that process confusing. 46 Article I defines
the term "damage" for the purpose of the Convention and lim-
its that term to physical, psychological, or property damage 47
and loss of life. 48 Article II provides for payment of compensa-
critical impasse by hosting informal discussion in New Delhi in March 1969
with the United States, Belgium, the Soviet Union and Hungary ....
Reis, supra note 19, at 126. "With views so widely differing it is hardly surprising that
it took considerable time to reach agreement." P. van Fenema, The 1972 Conven-
tion on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects 179 (August
1973) (unpublished manuscript available in McGill University Law Library).
44. Foster, supra note 2, at 140-41. "[Ilntensive work on... [the liability] ques-
tion had to await the completion of a declaration of basic principle." Id. at 141.
45. Liability Convention, supra note 1, arts. I, II, XII. These articles provide, in
pertinent part:
For the purposes of this Convention:
(a) The term "damage" means the loss of life, personal injury or other
impairment of health; or loss of or damage to property of States or of per-
sons, natural or juridical, or property of international intergovernmental
organizations;
Id. art. I;
A launching State shall be absolutely liable to pay compensation for damage
caused by its space object on the surface of the earth or to aircraft in flight.
Id. art. II;
The compensation which the launching State shall be liable to pay for dam-
age under this Convention shall be determined in accordance with interna-
tional law and the principles ofjustice and equity, in order to provide such
reparation in respect of the damage as will restore the person, natural or
juridical, State or international organization on whose behalf the claim is
presented to the condition which would have existed if the damage had not
occurred.
Id. art. XII.
46. See infra notes 52-56 and accompanying text.
47. "[L]oss of or damage to property" has been described as "an interference
with the property resulting in the destruction or damage of the property or in its
being in any way . . . rendered unfit for the use for which it was intended." Foster,
supra note 2, at 156-57.
48. Liability Convention, supra note 1, art. I. The limitation of the term to these
concepts "reflects the idea of sharing the burden of damage caused in operating
sources of special danger between the operator of the technology and the parties that
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tion for "damage," presumably as defined in article J.49 Under
article XII, compensaton for damage is to be "determined in
accordance with international law and the principles of justice
and equity," so that the claimant will be restored to the condi-
tion that would have existed had no damage occurred. 50 Arti-
cles XIV through XX establish and set out the guidelines for a
Claims Commission, which handles disputes between nations
unable to resolve such disputes through diplomatic
procedures."
The restoration proposed by article XII is beyond the
scope of the limited definition of "damage" in article I. For
sustained the damage." G. ZHUKOV & Y. KOLOSOV, supra note 2, at 105. It is argued
that the risk of damage from space activities should be borne by the international
community as a whole, and not solely by the launching state. Id. at 104-05.
"No other larger definition of damage exists in any international instrument.
This definition, comprehensive as it is, was reached as a result of extending the con-
cept in all possible ways." Cocca, supra note 19, at 93. But see STAFF REPORT, supra
note 13, at 23. When the United States Senate examined the Liability Convention in
1972, it predicted that the article I definition of damage would become "one of the
major problem areas of the Convention." Id.
49. Liability Convention, supra note 1, art. II. This is consistent with the view
that "[o]ther types of damage are not eligible for reparation under the convention."
G. ZHUKOV & Y. KOLOSOV, supra note 2, at 105.
50. Liability Convention, supra note 1, art. XII. This measure of compensation
was decided on by the Legal Sub-Committee when no agreement could be reached
on the applicability of the law of any particular state. P. van Fenema, supra note 43, at
179-87; see STAFF REPORT, supra note 13, at 33-34; Szilagyi, Protection of Outer Space
Environment-Questions of Liability, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTY-FIFTH COLLOQUIUM
ON THE LAw or OUTER SPACE 53, 53 (1982). The deadlock was caused by disagree-
ment on two issues: the settlement of claims and the question of applicable law. P.
van Fenema, supra note 43, at 184; see infra note 57.
The final text of article XII, adopted pursuant to a compromise between factions
of the Legal Sub-Committee, was designed primarily to provide full compensation to
victims and restore them to the status quo ante. See infra notes 57-69 and accompany-
ing text. See generally P. van Fenema, supra note 43, at 185-92 (discussing the presen-
tation and debate on the language which ultimately became article XII).
51. Liability Convention, supra note 1, arts. XIV-XX; see C. CHRISTOL, supra note
3, at 82-83; Foster, supra note 2, at 173-77. If diplomatic negotiations are unsuccess-
ful after one year following submission of a claim, a Claims Commission can be called
by either party. See Liability Convention, supra note 1, art. XIV. The Commission has
three members. One member is to be nominated by the claimants, one member will
be nominated by the respondents, and one member will be nominated by the parties
jointly. Id. art. XV. The purpose of the Claims Commission is to provide a forum for
the settlement of disputes where the parties cannot agree through diplomacy. See id.
art. XIV.
Decisions of the Commission are not binding but are subject to immediate publi-
cation. Id. art. XIX. This is an odd result which created much debate in the Legal
Sub-Committee. Foster, supra note 2, at 175.
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example, the drafters were aware, as article XXI attests, 52 that
the reentry of a space vehicle might present large-scale danger
to human life and might seriously threaten vital population
centers.53 Article XII, with its reference to international law
and the principles ofjustice and equity,54 seems to compensate
for damages incurred by a state in taking reasonable meaures
to prevent the threatened danger.55  Nevertheless, article I
precludes such recovery by limiting damage to the items
listed.56
52. Liability Convention, supra note 1, art. XXI. Article XXI provides as follows:
If the damage caused by a space object presents a large-scale danger to
human life or seriously interferes with the living conditions of the popula-
tion or the functioning of vital centers, the States Parties, and in particular
the launching State, shall examine the possibility of rendering appropriate
and rapid assistance to the State which has suffered the damage, when it so
requests. However, nothing in this article shall affect the rights or obliga-
tions of the States Parties under this Convention.
Id.
53. Article XXI recognizes the danger but does very little about it. It imposes
on the launching state the obligation, in the event of such danger, to "examine the
possibility" of giving some sort of help and then only if the damaged state requests it.
Id. It does not affect the rights and obligations of the parties in the other articles of
the Convention. Rajski, supra note 17, at 256; see also STAFF REPORT, supra note 13, at
38 ("Use of the word 'examine' appears to indicate that a state is not obligated under
the Convention to actually render such assistance."). See generally Cheng, supra note
3, at 132-33 (discussing article XXI of the Liability Convention).
54. Liability Convention, supra note 1, art. XII.
55. "National courts generally take these factors [preventive measures] into ac-
count when granting compensation, considering that the victim should take steps to
mitigate damage and that costs incurred in doing so should be recoverable." Legault
& Farand, supra note 37, at 13. This is especially true if the term "equity" in article
XII is used in its popular sense to signify moral justice and not in the Anglo-Ameri-
can legal sense. See Alexander, Measuring Damages Under the Convention on International
Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, 6J. SPACE L. 151, 153 (1978). "Pursuant to
such a formulation, it would be possible to avoid the rigors of strictly legal ap-
proaches to the measurement of damages and adapt relief to the circumstances of
any given case." Christol, supra note 13, at 358. If the measure of compensation is to
be determined by international law and the principles ofjustice and equity, and if the
tribunal has "the power to meet the moral standards of justice in a particular case
. . . so as to adapt the relief to the circumstances of the particular case," H.L. Mc-
CLINTOCK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EQurTV 1 (1948), it is inconsistent to argue that
article XII does not require the launching state to compensate the victim state for
preventive measure damages when the victim state was in no way responsible for the
landing of the space object.
56. G. ZHUKOV & Y. KoLosov, supra note 2, at 105; see supra note 48 and accom-
panying text.
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IV. LEGAL SUB-COMMITTEE'S DEBATE ON
COMPENSATION FOR DAMAGE
The Legal Sub-Committee's treatment of the measures of
compensation in article XII consisted largely of a debate over
whether the measure should be determined by reference to
general international law or to the law of a particular state.57
57. See Dembling & Arons, supra note 39, at 366; Diederiks-Verschoor, Conven-
tion on International Liability Caused by Space Objects, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIFTEENTH
COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 96, 101 (1972).
On April 29, 1963, during the second session of the Legal Sub-Committee,
Belgium submitted a proposal entitled Working Paper Submitted by the Belgian Del-
egation on the Unification of Certain Rules Governing Liability for Damage Caused
by Space Devices. U.N. Doc. A/AC. 105/C.2/L.7 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Belgian
Proposal]; see C. CHRISTOL, supra note 3, at 63; Dembling & Arons, supra note 39, at
349. This paper opened debate on one of the most difficult issues that was to come
before the Legal Sub-Committee: the identification of the law to be applied to the
determination of compensation. C. CHRIsToL, supra note 3, at 64; see also Dembling &
Arons, supra note 39, at 366-69 (discussing the debate on applicable law). The Bel-
gian Proposal, in defining damage, proposed that the national law of the injured per-
son should govern the classification of compensable losses. U.N. Doc.
A/AC.105/C.2/L.7, at 1 (1963); see C. CHRISTOL, supra note 3, at 64; Dembling &
Arons, supra note 39, at 355; P. van Fenema, supra note 43, at 176-77.
A later United States proposal sought to base determination of the measure of
compensation on international law and the principles of justice and equity. United
States Proposal, Convention Concerning Liability for Damage Caused by the
Launching of Objects into Outer Space, U.N. Doc. A/AC. 105/C.2/L.8 (1964) [here-
inafter cited as United States Proposal]; see C. CHRISTOL, supra note 3, at 62;
Dembling & Arons, supra note 39, at 355; P. van Fenema, supra note 43, at 176.
The Hungarian Proposal, Hungary: Revised Draft Convention Concerning Lia-
bility for Damage Caused by the Launching of Objects into Outer Space, U.N. Doc.
A/AC.105/C.2/L.10 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Hungarian Proposal], while not
exactly applying a particular national law, provided that "loss of profits and moral
damage" might be recovered "whenever compensation for such damage is provided
for by the law of the State liable for damage in general." U.N. Doc.
A/AC.105/C.2/L.10/Rev.I, at 2; see C. CHRISTOL, supra note 3, at 67; Dembling &
Arons, supra note 39, at 355; P. van Fenema, supra note 43, at 176.
For a table comparing these three proposals, see Liability for Damage Caused by
Objects Launched into Outer Space, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/W.2/Rev.3 (1965).
Of the three proposals, only the Belgian Proposal, supra, made any connection be-
tween the definition of damage and the law applicable to compensation. Specifically,
it proposed that "['d]amage' shall be understood to mean any loss for which compen-
sation may be claimed under the law of the place where the loss is caused." U.N.
Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/L.7/Rev.2, art. 2, at 2; see Dembling & Arons, supra note 39, at
378.
The debate over applicable law shaped up between those nations who thought
that the law of the launching state should govern and those who thought that the law
of the state of the injured party or of the state of the occurrence of the harm was the
appropriate choice. See P. van Fenema, supra note 43, at 179; infra notes 64-66 and
accompanying text. See generally Cheng, supra note 3, at 122-31 (discussing the Legal
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The Soviet bloc nations58 backed a proposal calling for appli-
cation of the law of the launching state.59  These nations
Sub-Committee's treatment of applicable law); Dembling & Arons, supra note 39, at
366-68 (report on the debate on applicable law).
The scope of this debate, as perceived by the United States delegate to the Legal
Sub-Committee, was as follows: "As we understand it, applicable law involves the
legal context which the liability convention will provide to serve as a guide in deter-
mining what elements of that particular claim are to be treated as compensable under
the treaty regime." U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/PV.73, at 63 (1969) (statement of the
United States).
This statement embodies the Legal Sub-Committee's approach to the definition
of compensable harms. The Sub-Committee, unable to agree upon the inclusion of
the term "indirect damage" or any similar term in the article I definition of damage,
abandoned its discussion of the definition without ever reaching an agreement on
whether any damage other than the items listed in article I would be compensable. P.
van Fenema, supra note 43, at 33. It later addressed the issue of indirect damage in
the context of applicable law. Id. It finally resolved that the question of indirect
damages would be left. to be "fought out, in each separate case, by the parties in-
volved according to international law, and the principles of justice and equity, with
the purpose of restoring the victim to the condition which would have existed if the
damages had not occurred." Id.
This development essentially deferred the whole question of the compensability
of damages to the parties to resolve in whatever manner they may choose. Cf. Sum-
mary Record of the Fifty-Fourth Meeting, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.54, at 11
(1966) (statement of Romania) ("[t]hus, to invoke international law was simply to
defer the whole question."); Dembling & Arons, supra note 39, at 367 (discussing
statement of Romanian delegate); see also N. MATrE, supra note 19, at 157 ("in each
case, this question will have to be decided upon the basis of international law and the
principles ofjustice and equity..."). As a result, the limited definition of damage in
article I precludes the application of international law to the issue of which damages
are compensable. See Gorove, Cosmos 954: Issues of Law and Policy, 6J. SPACE L. 136,
142 (1978).
58. The Soviet bloc nations included the Soviet Union, Bulgaria and Hungary.
See Cheng, supra note 3, at 123 n.246. "[T]he other members of the Legal Sub-Com-
mittee, including Romania" were opposed to the "Soviet Block" view on applicable
law. Id. at 123. There seems to be no simple way to discern which states joined
which bloc, Soviet or non-Soviet, in the debate on applicable law. The ambiguous
nature of these labels in the first place increases the difficulty of determining which
nations joined which in the Legal Sub-Committee. It is certain, however, that Hun-
gary and Bulgaria joined the Soviet Union in the debate, while the non-Soviet bloc
included at least the United Kingdom, Austria, Canada, Sweden, and Italy. Id.; see also
II MANUAL ON SPACE L. 461 (list of United Nations Documents emanating from
COPUOS and its Legal Sub-Committee between July 14, 1959 and November 29,
1971, when G.A. Res. 2777, supra note 2, the Resolution accepting the Liability Con-
vention, was adopted, all dealing with the question of liability).
59. Cheng, supra note 3, at 123-24; Deleau, supra note 42, at 882; Dembling &
Arons, supra note 39, at 367. It was the Hungarian Proposal, supra note 57, which
first presented the idea of applying the law of the launching state to the determina-
tion of compensation for the purposes of the Convention. U.N. Doc.
A/AC.105/C.2/L.10/Rev.I, at 2-3. The Hungarian Proposal provided that states
which did not recognize immaterial damage would not have to pay for such damage.
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wished to spread the "burden of damage ' 60 that resulted from
the advancement of space technology and use, and to retain
some degree of control over those damages for which they
might become liable.6'
The non-Soviet bloc nations6 2 countered that such a pro-
vision would make it too easy for launching states to fashion
special statutes limiting their own responsibility. 63 Provisions
calling for the application of the law of the state of the victim
64
or of the state where the damage occurred 65 drew support
Id. at 2; see P. van Fenema, supra note 43, at 178. The Soviet Union argued in this
vein that that imposition of "moral damages," which it perceived as a form of punish-
ment, was a violation of sovereignty because states cannot punish each other through
international law. Summary Record of the One Hundredth Meeting, U.N. Doc.
A/AC. 105/C.2/SR. 100, at 138 (1968) (statement of U.S.S.R.); P. van Fenema, supra
note 43, at 178. The Soviet Union therefore supported the Hungarian Proposal. Id.
60. See G. ZHUKOV & Y. KOLOSOV, supra note 2, at 105. The argument was based
upon the notion that since all mankind benefits from the advancement of space tech-
nology, victim states should share with launching states in compensation for damage.
Id. at 104.
61. For example, the Soviet bloc states wished to avoid paying compensation for
"moral and immaterial damage," which is not compensable in those states. Cheng,
supra note 3, at 124.
62. See supra note 58.
63. U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.100, at 136-37 (statement of Italy); Dembling
& Arons, supra note 39, at 367. "This was precisely what all the other [i.e. non-Soviet
bloc] states were afraid of; for it would mean, for most of them, that their own nation-
als, if injured, would be grossly under compensated." Cheng, supra note 3, at 125; see
also Deleau, supra note 42, at 882 (the Soviet proposal would only be acceptable to
nations who had legal systems similar to that of the Soviet Union). The United States
view was that:
[T]he suggestion that the law of the launching State might be relevant is
inconsistent with a strict view of the sovereignty of States. Insistence on the
application of some foreign system of law to injuries suffered by United
States citizens in the United States would amount to a suggestion that the
Constitution and the laws of the United States were somehow inappropriate,
irrelevant or insufficient.
U.N. Doc. A/AC. 105/PV.73, at 66 (1969). The law of the launching state was there-
fore unacceptable to all of the non-Soviet bloc states and Romania. P. van Fenema,
supra note 43, at 177.
64. Belgian Proposal, supra note 57, at 1; see Cheng, supra note 3, at 122-24 (dis-
cussing the non-Soviet bloc proposals); Nanda, Liability for Space Activities, 41 U. COLO.
L. REV. 509, 519-21 (1969). The application of the national law of the person injured
was objected to because of the possibility that, in case the damage involved victims of
many different nationalities, a veritable plethora of domestic laws would apply in re-
spect of the same incident, thus complicating the procedures. P. van Fenema, supra
note 43, at 178; see Deleau, supra note 42, at 882. Furthermore, the application of so
many different laws is likely to produce inconsistent adjudications of the same case.
P. van Fenema, supra note 43, at 178.
65. The law of the place where the damage occurred, or lex loci delicti commissi,
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from most of the non-Soviet bloc states. 66
The Soviet bloc nations opposed this proposal because
they were afraid that nonspace powers would fashion ex-
tremely self-serving laws, and that launching states might
thereby be held internationally responsible for damages they
would not be liable for under their own laws. 6 7 Clearly, a com-
promise was necessary. 68
was proposed by France. Summary Record of the Ninety-First Meeting, U.N. Doc.
A/AC. 105/C.2/SR.91, at 9 (1968) (statement of France). It quickly gathered support
from nations wishing to apply a national law. P. van Fenema, supra note 43, at 179; see
Cheng, supra note 3, at 123.
This proposal had the advantage of allowing nations the opportunity to ensure
that their subjects would get the same treatment as any other victims in a given case,
and that relief would "not differ according to the type of accident." Summary Rec-
ord of the Ninety-Ninth Meeting, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.99, at 131 (1968)
(statement of France); see P. van Fenema, supra note 43, at 179.
66. See supra note 58. The United States Proposal, supra note 57, called for the
application of international law and the principles ofjustice and equity to the deter-
mination of compensation for damages. Id. While the United States temporarily
gave support to the concept of lex loci delicti commissi in this context, it eventually re-
turned to its original proposal. See Cheng, supra note 3, at 127.
67. Cheng, supra note 3, at 124-25. The worst Soviet fear seemed to be that they
would be forced to pay exorbitant compensation for "moral and immaterial" dam-
age. Id. The Soviet Delegate said that "in his delegation's view the draft agreement
should not apply to compensation for moral damage or, in other words, pain and
suffering." U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.100, at 137 (1968) (statement of the
U.S.S.R). This view was based on the difference between Soviet law, which does not
allow awards of punitive damages, and the civil law of countries which do allow puni-
tive damage awards. Id. at 137-38.
That Soviet fear was probably well-founded. In the words of the Italian Dele-
gate, the advantage of allowing for application of the law of the place of the accident
was that it "would provide more effective protection for the victim, since the State
concerned might well pass a special law in favour of its own nationals." Id. at 137
(statement of Italy). This concept was also expressed by reference to "full compensa-
tion" made by many of the delegates. See, e.g., Cocca, supra note 19, at 92. This was a
central theme of the debate on applicable law. See Cheng, supra note 3, at 125; see also
Rajski, supra note 17, at 253 (discussing "full compensation").
The views of many of the delegates were summed up by the delegate from Leba-
non, who stated that "[w]hat he wanted was simply the law that was most favourable
to the victim state." Verbatim Record of the Seventy-Fifth Meeting, U.N. Doc.
A/AC.105/PV.75, at 102 (1969) (statement of Lebanon); see U.N. Doc.
A/AC.105/C.2/SR.100, at 134 (1968) (statement of Czechoslovakia). "Mr. Riha...
said that a number of speakers had stressed that the proposed convention should be
as simple as possible, should be designed to protect the interests of the victim and
that its provisions should be specific." Id. at 134; U.N. Doc. A/AC. 105/C.2/SR.99, at
131 (1968) (statement of France). "The main concern of his country was for the
victim, who should be ensured the same treatment whatever the circumstances. It
was essential that regulations concerning the victim should be uniform and should
not differ according to the type of accident." Id.; Cheng, supra note 3, at 129.
68. Dembling & Arons, supra note 39, at 367-68; see also Cheng, supra note 3, at
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The Legal Sub-Committee finally adopted a compromise
proposal that compensation should be determined in accord-
ance with international law and the principles of justice and
equity. 69 Although the proposal was not greeted with enthusi-
asm," it eventually won the grudging support of the Legal
Sub-Committee. 7'
122-31 (discussing proposals and counter-proposals on applicable law). See generally
P. van Fenema, supra note 43, at 179-85 (discussing the complete "deadlock" be-
tween opposing members of the Legal Sub-Committee).
69. Liability Convention, supra note 1, art. XII; see United States Proposal, supra
note 57, art. 11(4). The debate on applicable law and the settlement of disputes drag-
ged on through the ninth session in 1970. P. van Fenema, supra note 43, at 181. In
that session, Italy made reference to the United States Proposal, supra note 57, of
using international law without any reference to national law in the determination of
compensation. Id.; see Summary Record of the One Hundred Forty-Ninth Meeting,
U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.149, at 81 (1970) (statement of Italy); see also Cheng,
supra note 3, at 130 (discussing the statement of the Italian delegate).
During the ninth session, debate was mostly informal, but when the plenary
meetings began again, it was clear that no agreement had been reached on these two
issues. P. van Fenema, supra note 43, at 181. It was during this session as well that
the concept of restoration "in full to the condition equivalent to that which would have existed
if the damage had not occurred" was introduced. Id. at 182.
Just when "deadlock was complete," a more favorable political climate prevailed
and in 1971 the two major space powers were finally induced to agree on a compro-
mise proposal submitted by Belgium, Hungary and Brazil. P. van Fenema, supra note
43, at 184. This compromise proposal marked a return to the approach of the United
States Proposal, supra note 57, and was eventually, "with some ... stylistic changes
• ..embodied in the joint Belgium, Brazil and Hungary proposal presented to the
tenth session of the Legal Sub-Committee in 1971." Cheng, supra note 3, at 130;
see Summary Record of the One Hundred Sixty-Second Meeting, U.N. Doc.
A/AC. 105/C.2/SR. 162, at 71 (1971) (introduction of joint proposal).
70. Criticism of the proposal was based on the view that international law was
too vague to provide sufficient guidelines for the determination of compensation.
Rajski, supra note 17, at 252; P. van Fenema, supra note 43, at 185-86; see also Deleau,
supra note 42, at 886 (acceptance of the compromise language was arrived at "sans
enthousiasme"). The Romanian Delegate to the Legal Sub-Committee, in particular,
criticized the compromise language of the compensation provision because he said
that there is "no established international law in the field under consideration ....
There were no generally recognized rules of law that were applicable .... "U.N.
Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.54, at 11 (1966) (statement of Romania).
71. Deleau, supra note 42, at 886. See generally Cheng, supra note 3, at 128-3 1.
The compromise text on compensation found support in the statement of the Italian
Delegate of June 11, 1971. Summary Record of the One Hundred Fifty-Sixth Meet-
ing, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.156 (1971) (statement of Italy). He maintained
that international law was clear in requiring that "reparation must, as far as possible,
wipe out all the consequences" of the damage-causing event and reestablish situa-
tions which would, in all probability have existed if the damage had not occurred. Id.
at 32; see U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.99 (1968) (statements of Canada and Italy);
U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.100 (1968) (statement of United Kingdom).
When the reference to the principles ofjustice and equity is seen as a reference
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The result is that because of inconsistencies in the defini-
tion and determination of damages, the Liability Convention is
incapable of providing prompt compensation to a victim that
suffers anything other than physical, psychological, or property
damage or loss of life.72 The Cosmos 954 incident provided
the first case where a claim was made by one sovereign state
against another based on the Liability Convention.73 Since the
resolution of the Cosmos 954 incident, speculation on the
recoverability of damages under the Convention has grown.7 4
V. THE COSMOS 954 INCIDENT
A. Background
Cosmos 954 was an ocean surveillance satellite 75 that had
to "recognized standards and not to that of particular society," the argument that
international law is too vague loses much of its validity. Rajski, supra note 17, at 252.
As one commentator has observed,
many. . . states. . . held the erroneous idea that the matter had little to do
with public international law and that, in order to achieve their objective,
private international law dictated the choice of the lex loci delicti commissi. A
number of them committed the further mistake of either believing that pub-
lic international law was, in this regard, vague and deficient, or thinking that
the fact space law was still "embryonic" had anything to do with the matter,
as if the problem was specific to space law.
Cheng, supra note 3, at 125-26. See generally Dembling & Arons, supra note 39, at 367
(report on the progress of the Legal Sub-Committee on the issue of applicable law).
This point takes on added emphasis if the term equity is used in its popular sense to
signify moral justice and not in its Anglo-American legal sense. See supra note 55.
72. See supra notes 52-56 and accompanying text.
73. Schwartz & Berlin, After the Fall: An Analysis of The Canadian Claim for Damage
Caused by Cosmos 954, 27 McGILL L.J. 676, 677 (1982). There have been, however,
numerous reentries by space objects into the earth's atmosphere since the beginning
of space exploration. See STAFF REPORT, supra note 13, at 74; Facts on File, Feb. 4,
1978, at 57. Two United States spacecraft bearing nuclear reactors had reentered the
atmosphere accidentally and had disintegrated. Id.
More recently, the nuclear-powered Soviet satellite Cosmos 1402 fell from its
orbit and plunged into the atmosphere over the Indian Ocean. Most of it burned up
on reentry and the remains, if any, fell harmlessly into the ocean. Wilford, Russian
Satellite Falls Harmlessly Over Indian Ocean, N.Y. Times, Jan. 24, 1983, at A1, col. 6.
74. See, e.g., G. ZHUKOv & Y. KoLosov, supra note 2, at 67-68; Alexander, supra
note 55; Cheng, supra note 3; Deleau, supra note 42, at 885-88; Gorove, supra note 57;
Haanappel, supra note 7; Legault & Farand, supra note 37, at 25-30; Reis, supra note
19; Schwarz & Berlin, supra note 73; Wilkins, supra note 14.
75. According to United States officials, the satellite was used to conduct surveil-
lance of United States Navy surface ships. Facts on File, Feb. 4, 1978, at 57. "The
2,727 kilogram (6,000 pound) spacecraft carried a reactor containing 45 kilograms
(100 pounds) of uranium-235 which was used to generate electricity for the radar
that tracked the U.S. ships." Id.; see Canada: Claim Against the Union of Soviet So-
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been placed in orbit by the Soviet Union on September 18,
1977.76 On January 6, 1978, the satellite was sharply depres-
surized for unknown reasons and began to fall. 77 The satel-
lite's descent was noted and traced by the North American Air
Defense Command 78 (NORAD), which warned countries in a
position of risk beneath the path of the falling satellite.79 On
January 24, 1978, the satellite reentered the earth's atmos-
phere over the Northwest Territories of Canada and spread
debris80 over an area of 124 thousand square miles.8' The So-
viet satellite was equipped with a nuclear reactor 82 which
caused great concern about the possibility of serious nuclear
contamination in Canada.83
cialist Republics for Damage Caused by Soviet Cosmos 954, reprinted in 18 I.L.M. 899
(1979) [hereinafter cited as Canadian Claim]; Dembling, supra note 36, at 129; Le-
gault & Farand, supra note 37, at 2; Schwartz & Berlin, supra note 73.
76. The satellite had been launched into orbit 240 kilometers (150 miles) above
the earth. The reactor was supposed to have been boosted by rockets to a height of
1000 kilometers (625 miles) after use. At this height it would have taken the reactor
600 years to fall back to earth. Facts on File, Feb. 4, 1978, at 57.
77. This was according to the Soviet News Agency TASS. Dembling, supra note
36, at 130. According to reports, at least 12 nuclear reactors like the one in Cosmos
954 had been boosted into higher orbits. It remains unknown why the rockets of
Cosmos 954 failed to boost the reactor. Facts on File, Feb. 4, 1978, at 57.
78. Dembling, supra note 36; Legault & Farand, supra note 37, at 3; see Aikman,
Operation Morning Light, 2 Sentinel 5 (1978); Galloway, Nuclear Powered Satellites: The
U.S.S.R. Cosmos 954 and the Canadian Claim, 12 AKRON L. REV. 401 (1979).
The United States Air Force North American Air Defense Command (NORAD),
conducts operations, using radars, cameras, and radio equipment situated through-
out the world, to observe and track all objects launched into space. See C. CHRISTOL,
supra note 3, at 5; Doyle, supra note 12, at 107. "Among other functions, the NORAD
Space Defense Center also compiles predictions for satellites, rockets and other
pieces of debris that are likely to survive burnup in the friction of atmospheric reen-
try." Id.
79. See Dembling, supra note 36, at 130.
80. The satellite, upon reentry, "had ...broken up and spread across hun-
dreds of kilometres of almost totally uninhabited snow-covered land." Aikman, supra
note 78, at 8.
81. "The satellite reentered the earth's atmosphere at 6:53 a.m. EST January
24th over the Great Slave Lake in the Mackenzie District of Canada's Northwest Ter-
ritories and disintegrated from atmospheric friction 96 kilometers (60 miles) from
Yellowknife, the territorial capital." Facts on File, Feb. 4, 1978, at 57.
82. Canadian Claim, supra note 75, para. 2, at 902. According to Soviet corre-
spondence with Canada following the fall, the satellite carried on board a nuclear
reactor powered by uranium enriched with isotope of uranium-235. Id.
83. See Aikman, supra note 78, at 5; Galloway, supra note 78, at 401. The concern
was verbalized this way by Major Aikman: "Had the intensely radioactive core dis-
integrated while re-entering the earth's atmosphere? Or had it crashed, with its po-
tentially lethal fragments radiating from the depths of an all-encompassing snow? Or
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This concern led to a major search and recovery operation
by the Canadian Armed Forces and the Atomic Energy Control
Board of Canada, called Operation Morning Light.84 It was an
airborne and ground operation designed to locate and recover
or remove parts of the Soviet satellite and any nuclear debris. 85
Specifically, the Canadians' purpose was
to identify the nature and extent of the damage caused by
the debris, to limit the existing damage and to minimize the
risk of future damage and to restore to the extent possible
the affected areas to the condition that would have existed if
the intrusion of the satellite and the deposit of the debris
had both occurred?" Aikman, supra note 78, at 5; see also Dembling, supra note 36, at
130 ("the satellite's reactor [clould have produced about 100,000 curies of fission
products like strontium-90 and cesium-137. These are poisonous wastes of nuclear
power."); Schwartz & Berlin, supra note 73, at 677 (concern about the reactor led to a
large-scale airborne and ground recovery operation).
84. For a comprehensive account of Operation Morning Light, see Aikman,
supra note 78. "Fourteen minutes after re-entry was confirmed by the tracking instru-
ments of N.O.R.A.D., President Carter of the United States telephoned Prime Minis-
ter Trudeau [of Canada] to repeat an offer of immediate technical assistance for the
clean-up and recovery operations." Schwartz & Berlin, supra note 73, at 677; see Aik-
man, supra note 78, at 5. This offer was immediately accepted by the Canadians.
Canadian Claim, supra note 75, para. 3, at 902. The operation ran from the reentry
date to mid-October 1978, interrupted only by spring thaw. Schwartz & Berlin, supra
note 73, at 677.
Phase I lasted from January 24, 1978, to April 20, 1978. Phase II lasted from
April 21, 1978 to October 15, 1978 and had an original price tag of
Can.$1,921,904.55 in the statement of claim, Canadian Claim, supra note 75, para. 8,
at 904, but this was adjusted to Can.$1,822,687.08 by The Note of Mar. 15, 1979
from the Department of External Affairs of Canada in Ottawa to the Embassy of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 18 I.L.M. 909, 910 (1979). The total costs in-
curred by Canada in Operation Morning Light were Can.$12,048,239.11. Canadian
Claim, supra note 75, para. 8, at 904.
Canada claimed as compensation only the costs incurred "in order to restore
Canada to the condition which would have existed if the damage inflicted by the
Cosmos 954 satellite had not occurred," consistent with its claim for an article XII
measure of compensation. Canadian Claim, supra note 75, para. 19, at 906. The
language of paragraph 19 is drawn from article XII. Id. The amount claimed,
Can.$6,041,174.70, included only "incremental costs" that would not have been in-
curred if the incident had not taken place. Thus the salaries of military and public
servants involved in Operation Morning Light were not included, although overtime,
transport, and maintenance costs incurred by them as a direct result of the operation
were included. Thus, even though Canada spent approximately Can.$13 million on
the operation, only six million dollars were included in the claim. Canadian Claim,
supra note 75, para. 24, at 908.
85. Aikman, supra note 78, at 5. The Department of National Defense of Canada
led the search for nuclear debris, while the Atomic Energy Control Board of Canada
(AECB) was assigned general debris recovery duties. Id. see Legault & Farand, supra
note 37, at 4; Schwartz & Berlin, supra note 73, at 677.
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had not occurred.86
The total costs incurred by Canada in Operation Morning
Light were close to Can.$14 million.
Approximately one year after the incident, Canada
presented a claim against the Soviet Union 88 for just over Can.
$6 million as compensation for damage allegedly caused by the
86. Canadian Claim, supra note 75, para. 8, at 904.
87. Id.
88. The Soviet Union's delayed response to the questions of the Canadian Gov-
ernment regarding the satellite reentry was one reason for the year's lapse between
the incident and the claim. See id. paras. 4, 7, at 902-03. On the day the satellite
entered Canadian airspace, January 24, 1978, the Canadian Government had ex-
pressed to the Soviet Ambassador its surprise at not having been warned of the satel-
lite's possible reentry. Id. Later the same day, Soviet authorities offered to send a
"group of specialists to ameliorate the possible consequences and evacuate remnants
of the satellite." Id. para. 5, at 903. The Canadian response was that their "urgent
need was for immediate and complete answers to the questions posed earlier on Jan-
uary 24, 1978." Id. The Soviet aid, offered January 24, was declined because the
search and recovery operations had already begun. See Legault & Farand, supra note
37, at 5. According to certain authors, "[t]he Soviet Union may have been concerned
that the search and recovery programme was partly motivated by the desire to gather
intelligence about the construction of the Cosmos satellite and not for safety rea-
sons." Schwartz & Berlin, supra note 73, at 677.
Substantive information of any use to the Canadian authorities did not come
from the Soviet Union until May 31, 1978. Legault & Farand, supra note 37, at 5.
The initial diplomatic response of the Soviets ignored entirely the possibility of nu-
clear damage to Canadian territory. See Canadian Claim, supra note 75, annex B, at
917 (texts of Diplomatic Communications Between the Department of External Af-
fairs and the Embassy of the U.S.S.R).
While the Soviet Union eventually recognized that debris from Cosmos 954 did
indeed land in Canadian territory, it "practically excluded" the possibility of nuclear
contamination. Id. annex B, at 928 (note of May 31, 1978 from the Embassy of the
U.S.S.R. at Ottawa to the Department of External Affairs of Canada). The Soviet
Union did not request the return of the recovered parts of the satellite. Id. annex B,
at 916 (note of Feb. 20, 1978 from the Embassy of the U.S.S.R. at Ottawa). The
Soviets stated that "[t]he Embassy is authorized to state that the objects mentioned in
the Department's note of February 8, 1978 do not present interest to the Soviet side
as such and, consequently, the Canadian side can continue to dispose with them at its
own discretion." Id. The Soviet Note of March 21, 1978, from the Embassy of the
U.S.S.R. reiterated that: "The Embassy is authorized to state once again that those
objects as such do not present interest to the Soviet side and accordingly the Cana-
dian side can deal with them at its own discretion." Id. annex B, at 922.
The Soviet disclaimers may have been an attempt to avoid paying any compensa-
tion, under article 5 of the Return Agreement, for the search and recovery opera-
tions. Article 5 of the Return Agreement provides that: "Expenses incurred in fulfil-
ling obligations to recover and return a space object or its component parts under
paragraphs 2 and 3 of this article shall be borne by the launching authority." Return
Agreement, supra note 33, art. 5(5). Taken by itself, article 5 of the Return Agree-
ment appears to relieve the launching state of the duty to pay the costs of the search
and recovery operation so long as it does not ask for the return of the space object or
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fall of the Soviet satellite, Cosmos 954.89 The Canadians did
not rely exclusively on the Liability Convention in making this
claim. Instead, they based it primarily on the Liability Conven-
tion, and, secondarily, on general principles of international
law.90
its component parts. Legault & Farand, supra note 37, at 16; see supra notes 36-38 and
accompanying text.
89. Canadian Claim, supra note 75; see Legault & Farand, supra note 37, at 14.
Canada decided to depart from normal diplomatic procedure and publish the claim
and the accompanying documents and diplomatic exchanges between itself and the
Soviet Union. The Canadians felt that public knowledge of the claim would foster a
better understanding of the principles and rules of international law which were in-
volved. Id. at 14-15. The claim was drafted by an interdepartmental committee of
the Departments ofJustice and External Affairs of the Canadian Government. Id. at
6. The claim may be summarized as follows:
The main element of the claim, at least from a jurist's point of view, is the
"statement of claim". This document, in a first section titled "the facts",
recalls the events on a chronological basis. Mention is made of the launch-
ing of the satellite and the related notification to the Secretary General of
the United Nations, the entry of the satellite into earth's atmosphere, and
the scattering of debris over a wide area of Canadian territory. It analyses
the communications established between Canadian and Soviet authorities in
Ottawa. It explains the reasons that prompted the undertaking of search
and recovery operations. The objectives and costs of these operations are
fully described. A link is clearly established between the debris recovered
and the launching State, the USSR. In a second section entitled "the law",
the Canadian Government held the USSR responsible for the damage suf-
fered by Canada following the fall of Cosmos 954. Other documents were
included in the claim: annexes B, C, D and E contained technical data sup-
porting the allegations made by the Government of Canada in its statement
of claim.
Id. at 7-8.
90. Canadian Claim, supra note 75, para. 17, at 905; see Galloway, supra note 78,
at 413; Legault & Farand, supra note 37, at 9.
Canada's claim is based jointly and separately on (a) the relevant interna-
tional agreements and in particular the 1972 Convention on International Liabil-
ity for Damage caused by Space Objects, to which both Canada and the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics are parties, and (b) general principles of interna-
tional law.
Canadian Claim, supra note 75, para. 14, at 905. The claim itself indicated it was
based jointly and severally on applicable conventions and general principles of inter-
national law, but it relied heavily on the Liability Convention as the legal basis for the
claim. "In other words, the Canadian government chose to focus on the remedies
available under the convention rather than on other legal grounds." Legault &
Farand, supra note 37, at 9.
This focus is evident from paragraphs 15 through 19 of the claim. Paragraph 19
in particular addresses the measure of compensation under article XII of the Liability
Convention. Paragraph 19 reads as follows:
In respect of compensation for damage caused by space objects, the Con-
vention provides for " . . . such reparation in respect of damage as will re-
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B. Analysis of the Claim
Canada's use of a secondary claim based on general prin-
ciples of international law is illustrative of the problems a state
faces in attempting to frame a claim for damages under the
Liability Convention. Used as the basis of a claim for damages,
this secondary claim is superfluous and undercuts the validity
of the Convention by intimating its lack of force. 91 The pur-
poses of the Convention in establishing certain procedures
would be thwarted if other channels could be used to present a
claim.92
The elements of the Canadian Claim included damage to
store .. . [the claimant] to the condition which would have existed if the
damage had not occurred" (Article XII). In accordance with its Preamble,
the Convention seeks to ensure ". . . the prompt payment ... [under its
terms] of a full and equitable measure of compensation to victims of such
damage" (Fourth preambular paragraph). Canada's claim includes only
those costs which were incurred in order to restore Canada to the condition
which would have existed if the damage inflicted by the Cosmos 954 satellite
had not occurred. The Convention also provides that "[t]he compensation
which the launching State shall be liable to pay for damage under this Con-
vention shall be determined in accordance with international law and the
principles ofjustice and equity .. " (Article XII). In calculating the com-
pensation claimed, Canada has applied the relevant criteria established by
general principles of international law and has limited the costs included in
its claim to those costs that are reasonable, proximately caused by the intru-
sion of the satellite and deposit of debris and capable of being calculated
with a reasonable degree of certainty.
Canadian Claim, supra note 75, para. 19, at 906.
91. Schwartz & Berlin, supra note 73, at 707. "[T]he history of its development
and its text support the contention that the Liability Convention is intended to be ex-
haustive . . . . The international law of state responsibility for unintentional intru-
sions was uncertain to begin with, and its application to space objects even more
contentious." Id. The Principles Treaty was too broad to provide adequate clarity in
international law on this issue, and it was for this reason that the Liability Convention
was needed in the first place. See id. at 707-10. The history of the drafting of the
Liability Convention indicates that il was intended to be exhaustive of the claimant's
rights in space accident cases. That intent would be undermined if states could re-
sort to more ambiguous sources of international law to make further claims. Id. at
708-09.
92. Id. at 708-09. Article XI(2) of the Liability Convention, supra note 1, is con-
sistent with this notion in that it allows no claims outside the Convention for the
same damages as those claimed under the Convention. Article XI(2) provides as
follows:
A State shall not, however, be entitled to present a claim under this Conven-
tion in respect of the same damage for which a claim is being pursued in the
courts or administrative tribunals or agencies of a launching State or under
another international agreement which is binding on the States concerned.
Id. art. XI(2). See generally Schwartz & Berlin, supra note 73, at 711 (the general policy
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property,93 mitigation of or prevention of damage94 and viola-
tion of sovereignty.95 Of these, the primary claims were those
of damage to property and mitigation of damages.96
1. Damage to Property
The Canadian claim described as damage to property the
"deposit of hazardous radioactive debris from the satellite
throughout a large area of Canadian territory, and the pres-
ence of that debris in the environment rendering part of Can-
ada's territory unfit for use."9 7 It is not certain, however, that
damage as contemplated in article I of the Convention did in
fact occur,98 because the Cosmos 954 satellite landed in unin-
habited territory.99 This landing resulted in alteration of the
of article XI being that claimants under the Liability Convention should not be able
to resort to other channels).
93. Canadian Claim, supra note 75, para. 15, at 905.
94. Id. para. 17, at 905-06.
95. Id. para. 21, at 907.
96. See generally Legault & Farand, supra note 37, at 9-14 (analysis of the legal
basis for the Canadian Claim). "One of the more crucial assertion[s] in Canada's
claim was that regarding the existence of damage under the terms of the Liability
Convention." Id. at 9.
97. Canadian Claim, supra note 75, para. 15, at 905; cf. Foster, supra note 2, at
156-57 (discussing what constitutes damage to property under the Liability
Convention).
98. See Dembling, supra note 36, at 133 ("an argument may be made out that
there was no such damage since there was no loss of life, no personal injuries in-
volved, or other impairment of health"); Gorove, supra note 57, at 138, 140-42 (dis-
cussing the "intricate" process of assessing liability and the extent of the damage);
Haanappel, supra note 7, at 147-48 (the Liability Convention's definition of damage
"can by no stretch of the imagination" cover Canada's costs "in preventing potential
damage where actual damage never occurred or remains unmeasurable"). But see
Schwartz & Berlin, supra note 73, at 714-16 (discussing damage to persons and prop-
erty and mitigation); Legault & Farand, supra note 37, at 9-10 (discussing the Cana-
dian claim for damages).
99. Aikman, supra note 78, at 5, 8. Doubt about the existence of actual damage
was caused by the fact that the satellite landed in almost totally uninhabited territory.
Id. "This was in a sense fortunate, for the land between the two points consists of the
Barrenlands; for the most part a treeless, uninhabited area." Id. at 5. In fact, one of
the major discoveries of radiation, at the Thelon River site, was made accidentally by
two campers who had "left the campsite on January 25 to travel by dogsled north
along the Thelon River to learn more about the barrenlands." Id. at 8.
The unknown quality of the danger to human life was what necessitated the
cleanup operation and thus the great expense to which Canada went. Schwartz &
Berlin, supra note 73, at 716. The impossibility of making safe use of the land was
called "damage to property." Legault & Farand, supra note 37, at 9-10; cf. Foster,
supra note 2, at 156-57. Damage to property has been characterized as interference
1985] DAMAGES AFTER COSMOS 954
conditions on the land which, while making the territory un-
safe, made it unsafe to an unknown degree.'0 0 Unless there
was damage within the article I meaning of the word, article
XII was powerless to supply the compensation Canada sought
in its claim despite its reference to international law and the
principles of justice and equity.' 0" If the property damage is-
sue had come before a Claims Commission pursuant to articles
XIV through XX of the Liability Convention, it is conceivable
that Canada could have been denied recovery on this basis.10 2
2. Preventive Measures
Compensation was also sought by the Canadians pursuant
to a perceived "duty to take the necessary measures to prevent
and reduce the harmful consequences of the damage and
thereby to mitigate damages."'0 3 Canada's mitigation claim
consisted of search, recovery, removal, testing, and cleanup
therewith resulting in the property being rendered unfit for the use for which it was
intended. Id.
The Liability Convention makes no direct mention of nuclear damage. See G.
ZHUKOV & Y. KOLOSOV, supra note 2, at 102; Deleau, supra note 42, at 878. "In fact,
the view has been expressed that the convention covers every kind of damage, includ-
ing nuclear damage, but this does not follow from its text." G. ZHUKOV & Y.
KOLOSOV, supra note 2, at 102. The majority view seems to be that nuclear damages
are incorporated in the article I reference to "damage to property." See, e.g., C.
CHRISTOL, supra note 3, at 94; S. GOROVE, STUDIES IN SPACE LAW: ITS CHALLENGES
AND PROSPECTS 128 (1977); Cheng, supra note 3, at 115; Foster, supra note 2, at 155-
57.
100. See Aikman, supra note 78, at 5.
101. See Gorove, supra note 57, at 142; supra notes 52-56 and accompanying text.
"[Tihe occurrence of actual damage is the precondition of the invocation of the prin-
ciples ofjustice and equity as well as of the eventual restitution." Gorove, supra note
57, at 142. The argument has been made, based on the concept of a "precondition
of damage," that the article I definition "can by no stretch of the imagination cover
the costs incurred by Canada in preventing potential damage, where actual damage
never occurred or remains unmeasurable (such as general damage to the environ-
ment)." Haanappel, supra note 7, at 148-49 (footnote omitted).
102. Haanappel, supra note 7, at 149. This is especially true given that the refer-
ence to "justice and equity" introduces an arbitrary element, i.e., the views of the
claims judges, into the Convention's dispute resolution procedure. Legault &
Farand, supra note 37, at 13.
103. Canadian Claim, supra note 75, para. 17, at 905-06. This reveals some am-
biguity in the Canadian Claim. Paragraph 17 was printed in the section of the claim
entitled "International Agreements" under subheading "(a)." Subheading "(b)" was
reserved for "General Principles of International Law." Still, the mitigation claim in
paragraph 17 was based on general principles of international law, with no reference
at all to the Liability Convention. Most conspicuous by its absence from this para-
graph is any reference to article XII, the only article of the Liability Convention
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operations. 10 4 The Canadians based their claim for preventive
costs on general principles of international law alone without
reference to the Convention.10 5
Consideration of the preventive cost claim, as well as the
violation of sovereignty claim, requires rejection of the princi-
ple that the Liability Convention delimits the full extent of the
claimant's rights in a case involving damage caused by space
objects. 10 6  If Canada had claimed preventive costs based
solely on the Liability Convention, its costs would not be re-
coverable. ,07 However, under international law and the princi-
ples of justice and equity, preventive costs should be recover-
able where, as in the Cosmos 954 incident, they are reasonable
and measurable.' 8 While this is an equitable solution, espe-
cially in the Cosmos 954 incident,'0 9 it is not possible to be
which even hints that general principles of international law might provide some re-
lief. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
104. Canadian Claim, supra note 75, para. 17, at 905-06.
105. See id. (paragraph on preventive measures).
106. See supra note 91.
107. This is because of the inconsistencies pointed out earlier between articles I
and XII of the Liability Convention. See supra notes 52-56 and accompanying text.
It has been hypothesized that a space object might reenter the earth's atmos-
phere in such a manner as to cause "massive hysteria" in a densely populated city,
"requiring hospitalization of people for shock or mental anxiety." Gorove, supra
note 57, at 138-39. "What if some radiation injury had occurred requiring subse-
quent and extensive precautionary measures? Would the cost of such measures be
covered in addition to damage for radiation injuries?" Id.
Some think it would. See, e.g., Schwartz & Berlin, supra note 73, at 697. "[I]t
would not have been unthinkable . . . that the state might have had a valid claim for
damages . . . under . . . the Liability Convention. " Id.; see Christol, supra note 13, at
359.
The policies of the Liability Convention, see supra notes 12-19 and accompanying
text, require an affirmative response to Gorove's question. Schwartz & Berlin, supra
note 73, at 717. "[I]t would be entirely inconsistent with the expressly stated policy
of the Liability Convention not to allow compensation for costs in mitigating damages."
Id.
108. See Legault & Farand, supra note 37, at 13; supra note 55. See generally
Schwartz & Berlin, supra note 73, at 695-98 (discussing the prevention of future dam-
age by the Canadians).
109. If equity is used in the popular sense of the word, see supra note 55, article
XII of the Liability Convention would seem to require that the Canadian costs in-
curred by Operation Morning Light be considered by the Soviet Union.
"The purpose of compensation is, after all, to restore an economic position that
would have existed had an accident not occurred ....... .U.N. Doc.
A/AC. 105/PV.73, at 64 (1969) (statement of United States). Unfortunately for Can-
ada, article XII's reference to justice and equity does not require that Canada's pre-
ventive measures be considered by the Soviet Union. Article I limits the costs which
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compensated under article XII until damages as defined in arti-
cle I are proven.' 10
C. Diplomatic Resolution of the Cosmos 954 Incident
The Canadian claim against the Soviet Union was resolved
through diplomatic channels. 1 ' After three rounds of negotia-
tions in which the Canadian claim was discussed "with full con-
sideration given to its legal and factual implications," a settle-
ment was reached." 2 On April 2, 1981, a protocol was signed
between the Government of Canada and the Government of
the Soviet Union stating that the Soviets would pay, and Can-
ada would accept Can.$3 million in full settlement of the claim
and all matters arising out of the crash of the Soviet satellite.' 3
The text of the protocol gave no indication of a basis for agree-
must be considered by the Soviet Union to those incurred by the occurrence of physi-
cal, psychological, or property damage or loss of life. See supra notes 52-56 and ac-
companying text. The Canadians claimed that under general principles of interna-
tional law, Canada's duty to mitigate and prevent damages would be recognized, see
Canadian Claim, supra note 75, para. 17, at 905-06, but article I limits the application
of these general principles to cases of article I damage. In the Cosmos 954 incident,
it is not at all clear that there are any article I damages. See supra notes 98-101 and
accompanying text.
110. See supra notes 52-56 and accompanying text.
11. See Legault & Farand, supra note 37, at 18-19. Article IX of the Liability
Convention provides that a claim for compensation should be presented to a launch-
ing state through diplomatic channels. Liability Convention, supra note 1, art. IX.
Furthermore, article XIV states that if no diplomatic resolution is reached within one
year from the date of notice of the claim "the parties concerned shall establish a
Claims Commission at the request of either party." Id. art. XIV. It has been sug-
gested that such diplomatic negotiations had the purpose of defining the parameters
of a dispute before any sort of tribunal took jurisdiction. Legault & Farand, supra
note 37, at 18. "Direct diplomatic discussions, in a written or oral form, are the
simplest means offered to States in order to reach a settlement, particularly if the
discussions are exclusively bilateral. The aim of diplomacy in such circumstances is
to prevent, reduce or resolve conflicts that may arise between the two States." Id.
(footnote omitted).
112. Legault & Farand, supra note 37, at 19.
The Soviet response to Canada's claim cames [sic] one year after its formal
presentation. Before the expiration of this period, the Soviet authorities in-
dicated their willingeness [sic] to begin negotiations. The first round took
place in Ottawa in March 1980, the second in Moscow in June, and the third
and conclusive round was held in Ottawa in November of that same year.
The discussions took place at a time when East/West relations were deterio-
rating rapidly as a result of the invasion of Afghanistan and the western boy-
cott of the Moscow Olympic games.
Id.
113. Protocol Between the Government of Canada and the Government of the
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ment." 4 As a result, the resolution amounts to no more than a
tacit admission by the Soviets of their responsibility to the
Canadians in the wake of the Cosmos 954 crash. 1 5 In terms of
the application of the Liability Convention, the resolution of
the Cosmos 954 incident provides almost no guidance." 6
Speculation about the measure of damages will continue" 7 be-
cause the parties did not resort to the procedural provisions."t
8
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Moscow, April 2, 1981, reprinted in 20 I.L.M. 689
(1981) [hereinafter cited as Protocol].
114. Id.
115. Legault & Farand, supra note 37, at 20. "This laconic settlement obviously
does not address the matter of Soviet liability under the 1972 Liability Convention,
nor does it accept or reject any particular allegations that may have been made by
one party or the other during the course of negotiation of the claim." Id. at 19-20.
The acknowledgement of responsibility by the Soviets is somewhat clouded by the
actual monetary settlement. The Canadians published actual costs of approximately
Can.$13 million in connection with Operation Morning Light. Canadian Claim, supra
note 75, para. 8, at 903-04. They claimed six million dollars. Id. The Soviet Union
eventually agreed to pay one half of the claimed amount in the settlement. Protocol,
supra note 114. See Legault & Farand, supra note 37, at 26-27.
Canada was able to recover one half of its claim against the USSR, and given
the complex and controversial issues of fact and law that were involved in
this case of first impression, that result appears to be satisfactory not only
from a bilateral, political point of view but also from the broader legal per-
spective. It should help to promote the future implementation and elucida-
tion of the Liability Convention, whatever its value as a precedent stricu
sensu.
Id. It must, of course, be remembered that many factors weigh in the outcome of any
diplomatically resolved dispute. See id. at 21-22.
116. Legault & Farand, supra note 37, at 22. "It remains uncertain the settle-
ment of Canada's claim will set a precedent establishing a rule of international law
respecting State responsibility and liability beyond the circumstances of this particu-
lar case." Id. At best, "[a] practice has been established under which a launching
State will compensate other States that have suffered, or whose nationals have suf-
fered damage caused by space objects." Id. at 26.
117. Before the Protocol, supra note 114, it was expected that the issue of what
constitutes a "taking of property" would be resolved by the resolution of the Cosmos
954 incident. See Christol, supra note 13, at 347. It is evident that such clarification of
the Liability Convention has not occurred. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
118. Legault & Farand, supra note 37, at 19-23. Due to the diplomatic nature of
the resolution, there was no opportunity to see how the substantive provisions of the
Liability Convention would work in the context of a satellite reentry and crash. Id.
"Furthermore, it should be recognized that the Cosmos 954 claim was settled before
a formal legal dispute had arisen between the parties." Id. at 22-23.
Considering that Canada received approximately one-half of the damages
claimed which amounted to approximately one-half of the actual expenses of Opera-
tion Morning Light, it is evident that the only thing established by the Cosmos 954
resolution is that the victim might recover up to one-quarter of the costs incurred in
mitigation of damages in a case like this one. See id. at 19-23.
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VI. PROPOSAL
The Cosmos 954 incident focused international attention
on the Liability Convention,119 but failed to provide any guide-
lines regarding what damages are compensable under the Con-
vention. 20 As a result, a victim of space object damage is no
more certain to recover "full compensation" under the Liabil-
ity Convention today than it was before the Cosmos 954
incident.
The Legal Sub-Committee's treatment of articles I and XII
demonstrates a disregard for the necessary consistency be-
tween the definition of damages and the measure of compensa-
tion.' 2 ' This disregard comes from the perception of the dele-
gates that consideration of such terms as indirect damage or
delayed damage, in a discussion of damages, 22 would result in
no agreement at all on the definition.12 Unfortunately, the re-
119. See supra note 74. Volume Six of the Journal of Space Law was devoted
entirely to the Cosmos 954 incident and the liability resulting from space object
reentries.
120. See supra notes 116-18 and accompanying text.
121. See supra notes 57-74 and accompanying text.
122. "Indirect damage" and "delayed damage" are terms used to describe inju-
ries which are not the direct result of the harmful event but derive therefrom due to
conditions existing before the event or delayed reactions to the event. See C. CHRIS-
TOL, supra note 3, at 95-97; Christol, supra note 13, at 358-65; Foster, supra note 2, at
155-60.
123. C. CHRISTOL, supra note 3, at 117. "[H]ad it not been for the decision to
use the formulation on applicable law set out in Article 12, namely, international law
and the principles ofjustice and equity, . . . an extended effort to review and agree
on municipal law standards would have prevented reaching a final agreement." Id.;
see Japan: Working Paper, U.N. Doc. A/AC. 105/C.2/L.61 and Corr. 1, reprinted in Re-
port of the Legal Sub-Committee on the Work of its Eighth Session to the Committee
on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/58, annex II, at 31 (1969).
In order to avoid endless discussion on whether to include those terms of
'indirect damage' and 'delayed damage' in the definition of damage, we
should discuss the problem of these two terms in the context of the manner
in which the damage occurred, by introducing the notion of adequate rela-
tionship of cause and effect or so called 'the existence of proximity' in the
Anglo-American laws.
Id. This Japanese solution ignores the problem of the narrow definition of recover-
able damages in article I.
Use of the concept of causation to allow consideration of indirect damage or
delayed damage has been the subject of some comment. See, e.g., C. CHRISTOL, supra
note 3, at 96; Christol, supra note 13, at 361-62; Foster, supra note 2, at 157-58. How-
ever, this reliance on the concept of causation merely defers the determination of the
recoverability of damages to the parties in a particular case. See infra note 143 and
accompanying text.
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suiting definition eliminated any possibility that damages other
than those enumerated in article I would ever be recover-
able. 124  Article I does not include the concepts of indirect
damage or delayed damage in its definition. 125 However, arti-
cle XII, by incorporating international law and the principles
ofjustice and equity, necessarily encompasses indirect damage
and delayed damage concepts. 1
26
The Permanent Court of International Justice, 27 in the
Case Concerning the Factory at Chorzow, 1 28 addressed the issue of
the measure of damages in international law. That court stated
that:
reparation must, as far as possible, wipe out all the conse-
quences of the illegal act and reestablish the situation which
would, in all probability, have existed if that act had not
been committed. Restitution in kind, or, if this is not possi-
ble, payment of a sum corresponding to the value which a
restitution in kind would bear. .... 129
124. See supra notes 49-57 and accompanying text.
125. Liability Convention, supra note 1, art I; see supra notes 122-23.
126. See C. CHRISTOL, supra note 3, at 97. "International law, rather than munic-
ipal law, will be invoked in reaching a decision as to the exact amounts to be recov-
ered as damages." Id. This reliance on international law as expressed in article XII
of the Liability Convention as the method of securing recovery for indirect damages
ignores the precondition of actual damage required by article I of the Convention.
See supra notes 98-102 and accompanying text.
127. Often called the "World Court," the Permanent Court of International Jus-
tice (PCIJ) was created by the Statute for the Permanent Court of International Jus-
tice, 6 L.N.T.S. 391 (1921); see I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL
LAW, 712-13 (3d ed. 1979). The Covenant of the League of Nations, which became
Part I of the treaties of peace signed between the Allied and the Axis powers in 1919
and 1920, see M. HUDSON, THE PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE: 1920-
1942, 102 (1943), did not have the authority to create a permanent judicial organ.
However, the Covenant did lay the groundwork for a judicial organ by imposing on
the Administrative Council of the Permanent Court of Arbitration the obligation of
drawing up plans for what was to be called the Permanent Court of International
Justice. See S. ROSENNE, THE WORLD COURT: WHAT IT IS AND How IT WORKS 19-26
(3d ed. 1973). The PCIJ was closely connected to the League of Nations but was not
an organ of the League. Its procedures were governed by the Rules of Procedure,
adopted by the League in 1936 and taken over, virtually unchanged, by the United
Nations and the present International Court ofJustice. Id. at 22.
The PCIJ saw 66 cases in 18 years, 38 being contentious and 28 advisory.
Twenty-seven advisory opinions and 32 judgments were handed down by the PCIJ
and 12 cases were settled independently of that body. Id. at 23.
128. (Ger. v. Pol.), 1928 P.C.IJ., ser. A, No. 17 (Judgment of Sept. 13). At the
time of the Chorzow Factory Case, the PCIJ was still the judicial counterpart of the
League of Nations. See ROSENNE, supra note 127, at 22.
129. 1928 P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 17, at 47.
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Article XII already reflects this concept by providing "such
reparation . . . as will restore the person . . . on whose behalf
the claim is presented to the condition which would have ex-
isted if the damage had not occurred."'' 30 The definition of
damage in article I must be made consistent with the measure
of compensation in article XII; it must provide for damages to
be determined in accordance with international law.13'
In modern times,' 32 international courts and tribunals
have had little trouble assessing damages according to interna-
tional law.' 33 The principle of reparation enunciated in
Chorzow Factory provides an adequate basis for defining dam-
ages in the international legal context. 34 If the definition of
damages in the Liability Convention were consistent with the
definition in Chorzow Factory, it would also be consistent with
the definition in article XII and the Convention could more
adequately achieve its purpose. 35
The dominant purpose of the Liability Convention is to
provide full and fair compensation to victims of space related
damage. 36 Because international law provides an adequate
system for the determination and compensation of damages in
international law, damages should not be defined as narrowly
as they are defined in article I. Instead of limiting the Liability
Convention to a definition of damages that has the distinct
possibility of depriving deserving victims of compensation, the
definition should be expanded to allow recovery for damages
as defined by international law. The proposed definition
would thereby replace the limited article I definition with a def-
inition based on accepted principles of reparation and com-
pensation. The proposed definition will remedy the problem
left by the Return Agreement, which relieved the launching
state of the obligation to pay the cost of cleanup when it de-
130. Liability Convention, supra note 1, art. XII.
131. This would remove the inconsistency between the limited article I defini-
tion of damage and the broader definition of compensation in article XII. See supra
notes 72-74 and accompanying text.
132. "In modern times" means at least since the Jay Treaty arbitrations in 1794.
Cheng, supra note 3, at 126.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. See supra note 131.
136. See supra notes 14-19 and accompanying text.
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clined to request return of the space object. 13 7 The principle
that the launching state should be responsible for its space ob-
ject at all times after it is launched 3 1 is defeated unless the
launching state is held responsible for the cleanup, thereby re-
lieving the victim state of that burden.13 9 Under the proposed
definition, preventive measures and cleanup costs would be re-
coverable where they are measurable and reasonable.' 4 °
In drafting the Liability Convention, and in particular the
definition of damage caused by space objects, the Legal Sub-
Committee overlooked the fundamental premise on which the
international law of outer space is based.' 4 ' At its inception,
COPUOS agreed to apply international law, including the
Charter of the United Nations, to outer space." 42 However, in-
stead of looking to international law to define damages in the
Liability Convention, the Legal Sub-Committee drafted its own
extremely limited definition, and relied on a reference to inter-
national law and the principles of justice and equity in article
XII to broaden the article I definition. 14 3 The result is confu-
137. See Return Agreement, supra note 33, art. 5(5); supra notes 35-38 and ac-
companying text.
138. See Diederiks-Verschoor, Harm Producing Events Caused by Fragments of Space
Objects (Debris), in PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTY-FIFTH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF
OUTER SPACE 1, 3 (1982).
139. Id. This result would be consistent with the "principle of risk liability" es-
tablished by the Liability Convention. Id.
140. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
141. The international law of outer space is to be based on general principles of
international law including the Charter of the United Nations. See supra notes 21-22
and accompanying text.
142. See supra note 22.
143. See supra notes 70-74 and accompanying text. The general definition inten-
tionally leaves many issues unresolved "because it is impossible to enumerate-and it
would have been impossible to agree on-all the various kinds of damage for which
there would be compensation." P. van Fenema, supra note 43, at 31. "Some measure
of precision in this respect could only be expected from a national law, where a body
ofjurisprudence usually has given a more or less defined meaning to 'damage,' in the
sense of what is compensable and what not." Id. at 31-32.
The question of what kinds of damage will give rise to compensation was further
debated, together with the question of law or the principles to be applied to the
assessment of damages. Id. at 33. In essence, the question of what damages would
be compensable under the Liability Convention was meant to be deferred to the par-
ties through either diplomatic resolution or the Claims Commission. P. van Fenema,
supra note 43, at 33; see U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.54, at 11 (1966) (statement of
Romania). However, failure to defer the definition of what constitutes that damage
confuses the process because compensable damages are now unreasonably limited to
those listed in article I. See supra notes 101-02 and accompanying text.
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sion for states which suffer cleanup and preventive measure
costs.' 4 4 The burden of bearing cleanup costs is left with the
victim state.
CONCLUSION
The Liability Convention was completed after ten years of
discussion and debate in the Legal Sub-Committee of
COPUOS."4 5 A provision for the determination of compensa-
tion was arrived at through a compromise between members of
the Legal Sub-Committee who sharply disagreed on the law to
be applied to such determination. 46 As a result of this com-
promise, the Liability Convention does not make clear what
damages will be recoverable in accidents involving space ob-
ject damage. ' 47 This ambiguity undercuts the basic purpose of
the Liability Convention, which is to provide effective rules and
procedures for the prompt payment of compensation to vic-
tims of damage caused by space objects. 148
The uncertainty engendered by the compensation provi-
sion of the Liability Convention can be remedied by defining
damage, for the purposes of the Convention, consistently with
the compensation provision. 149 Under such a definition, inter-
national law and the principles of justice and equity would be
relied on both to define damage and to determine compensa-
tion for that damage. The Claims Commission and the diplo-
matic negotiators in a given case would then be better able to
arrive at an internationally recognized damage recovery and
the purpose of the Liability Convention would be more nearly
met.
Joseph A. Burke
144. See supra notes 103-04 and accompanying text.
145. See supra notes 23-44 and accompanying text.
146. See supra notes 57-72 and accompanying text.
147. See supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text.
148. See supra notes 14-19 and accompanying text.
149. See supra notes 119-44 and accompanying text.
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